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PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE RULE OF
LAW AS AN "UNSTRUCTURED INSTITUTION*
Peter M. Shane"
Both inside and outside the academy, a debate is raging in the United States about
the relative merits of what might be calledpresidentialist and pluralist interpretations
of the separation of powers. Presidentialism imagines that the Constitution vests in
the President a fixed and expansive category of executive authority that is largely im-
mune to legislative control or judicial review) Pluralism sees checks and balances
as the principle animating the separation of powers.2 It disputes the fixed nature of
executive power.3 It sees questions of separation of powers interpretation as calling
regularly for the careful calibration of each branch's authorities, all in the name of
government accountability to the law and to the citizenry.4
Aggressive presidentialism was a pillar of constitutional understanding in the
administrations of both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The Clinton ad-
ministration sometimes tended towards presidentialism in its handling of regulatory
oversight, although its professed constitutional doctrine was more often pluralist in
tone. Today, we are six years into the most radically presidentialist administration in
history, the presidency of George W. Bush. It is an administration that has frequently
announced the substance of its views on executive power through an unusual medium-
statements that the President releases in connection with his signing proposed legis-
lation into law.
What I want to argue here, however, is an even subtler connection between the
radical presidentialism of the current Bush administration and its practice with regard
to presidential signing statements. In particular, I want to argue that the Bush adminis-
tration's use of signing statements embodies a disturbingly thin and formalistic view
of the rule of law that goes hand-in-hand with its vision of the separation of powers.
* Portions of this paper are excerpted from PETER M. SHANE, MADISON's NIGHTMARE:
How ExEcuTivE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (forthcoming, University of
Chicago Press 2009).
** Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law and Director, Project on Law and
Democratic Development, Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University.
' See Peter M. Shane, Symposium, Policy at the Intersection of Law and Politics, When
Inter-branch Norms Break Down: OfArms-for-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns, "Presidential
Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups," 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 534 (2003).
2 See PeterM. Shane, PoliticalAccountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REv. 161, 195 (1995).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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The Bush administration's signing statement practice has been notable for two
distinct reasons. The first is the extremity of the constitutional vision that these state-
ments typically assert, especially with regard to the so-called "unitary executive."5
The second is their sheer volume, unmatched in the entire history of the executive. 6
Given the various other ways in which the administration has professed allegiance
to its radical view of the separation of powers, the substantive content of the Bush
signing statements is not surprising. But the obvious question is, why so many?
To appreciate the puzzle, we have to recall that these views, even if earlier GOP
Presidents pushed them less aggressively, were certainly held also by leading legal
thinkers under both Presidents Reagan and Bush 41.' So why does President Bush
43-as opposed to Reagan or Bush 41-feel compelled so often to resort to signing
statements in order to express his extreme constitutional theories? Bush's recent GOP
predecessors, facing Congresses controlled by Democrats, certainly had less political
room to work their will than he does. One might think that they would have been the
more strident in asserting their prerogatives of unilateral action. Is it not odd that
President Bush would be so insistent on his prerogatives in the face of Congresses
entirely in GOP control from 2003 to 2006,8 and partially in GOP control from 2001
to 2002? 9
To grasp this phenomenon, I think we have to understand that presidentialism
and pluralism can each operate not just as a constitutional philosophy, but also as an
ethos, that is, as a fundamental element of the spirit with which the government con-
ducts business. The Bush administration has operated until recently against the back-
drop of Republican-controlled Congresses and a Supreme Court highly deferential to
executive power. This political context has enabled the Bush administration not only
to elaborate presidentialism as a theoretical stance but also to operate very largely
within the premises of presidentialism, as if presidentialism really were what the
Constitution envisions. The Bush 43 administration has thus been a supreme labora-
tory of presidentialism at work. Not only has it insisted, in theory, on a robust con-
stitutional entitlement to operate free of legislative or judicial accountability, but it
also has largely gotten away with this stance. And that success-the administration's
unusual capacity to resist answering to Congress and to the courts-has fed, in turn, its
sense of principled entitlement, its theory that the Constitution envisions a presidency
answerable, in large measure, to no one.
' For an example of a signing statement citing the unitary executive power, see Statement
on Signing the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY CoMP.
PREs. Doc. 1518 (Aug. 19, 2004).
6 See Neil Kinkopf&Peter M. Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database ofPresidential
Signing Statements, 2001-2006 (Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 106), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1022202.
7 See id.
S U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2007 STATIsTIcAL ABsTRACT 249 (2007).
9 Id.
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Critics of the Bush 43 administration have not infrequently charged that the
administration's unilateralism is antagonistic to the rule of law. " After all, the ideal
of "a government of laws, and not of men"'" seems on its face to contradict President
Bush's expansive claims of plenary authority. Yet, no sane President claims to be
above the law, and George W. Bush takes pains to defend his controversial actions as
legal. These initiatives have included the widespread warrantless electronic surveillance
of Americans 2 and the aggressive interrogation of detainees in the war on terror.'
3
It is doubtful that President Bush thinks himself antagonistic to the rule of law. He and
his legal advocates presumably have a specific idea of what the rule of law consists
of. But what the administration seems to believe in is a version of the rule of law as
formalism. It is a rule of law that claims to be no more and no less than law as rules.
Under the Bush administration's conception of the rule of law, Americans enjoy a
"government of laws" so long as executive officials can point, literally, to some formal
source of legal authority for their acts. They would presumably count this as the rule
of law even if no institution outside the executive were entitled to test the consistency
of those acts with the source of legal authority cited.
In our checks and balances system, however, the formalist version of the rule of
law runs into two more or less immediate problems. The first is that the Constitution,
the document that vests the President with whatever core powers he has, is notoriously
vague. How is an executive branch formalist able to extract from such Delphic text
the constitutional license for virtually unlimited executive power? The answer turns
out to be, in effect, "[b]y converting every acknowledged grant of some executive
power into the most expansive and rigid category of power consistent with that grant."
In other words, to convert vague implications into hard and fast rules, extreme presi-
dentialism takes all conceded kernels of presidential power under the Constitution
to their furthest analytically plausible limit.
"o See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Bad Party Line: All the Reasons to Hate Bush's Wiretapping
Bill, SLATE, Sept. 18,2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2149874/; Jack Balkin, No Blank Check
For Bush, HARTFORD COURANT, May 16, 2004, at C1.
" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
12 "In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I authorized the National
Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international
communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations."
President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsl
releases/2005/12/20051217.html.
13 In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of
suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have
been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate program
operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.... This program has been
subject to multiple legal reviews by the Department of Justice and CIA
lawyers; they've determined it complied with our laws.
President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6,
2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
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Consider, for example, the implications of the threshold decision by the Framers
to make the President chief executive. Everyone agrees, presidentialists and pluralists
alike, that the President's position as chief executive implies some scope of constitu-
tionally vested supervisory authority with regard to the rest of the executive branch.
But, once that core is conceded, the devotees of presidentialism want to argue that
this authority must, as a matter of analytic logic, encompass the power to direct the
exercise of any and all discretionary authority vested in any subordinate executive
official. In other words, once acknowledged to be the overseer, the President must
automatically be regarded as "the Decider." 4 Indeed, according to the formalist mind-
set, the chief executive power must be extended categorically, or the grant of executive
power does not really amount to a rule. The emphasis on rule of law formalism thus
seems, at least superficially, to favor analytically expansive interpretation. We will
see later what is wrong with this logic. 5
The second problem, however, is that, as legal formalists, the President's lawyers
want to have some piece of paper-parchment might be preferable-to hold up as
authoritative legal support for any claim of executive authority. Constitutional text,
statutes, and judicial opinions are the pieces of paper that usually serve this kind of
function. Unfortunately for the presidentialists, the Constitution is ambiguous at best
on the nature of executive power. Congress enacts very few statutes that embody
anything like congressional ratification for the executive branch's most prodigious
ambitions. There are few judicial opinions supporting the Bush view of the presi-
dency because separation of powers disputes that implicate the President directly
are rarely litigated, and the courts have not been receptive to extreme presidentialist
claims of executive authority. 6 There are no cases to cite with anything like strong
support for many of the President's most frequently asserted claims, and there is fre-
quently strong contrary authority.'" There is thus a pressing need for the executive
branch to manufacture its own legitimating documents, formal pieces of paper that
seem to sanction the President's expansive assertions of unilateral power.
" I gratefully borrow the dichotomy of "overseer" and "decider" from the work of
Professor Peter Strauss. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President
in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696 (2007).
15 See infra Parts I-III.
16 For examples of the most significant recent losses for the Bush administration's theories
of executive power, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that foreign
national enemy combatants are entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen may be held as an enemy combat-
ant only pursuant to adjudicative procedures to determine his status that are sufficient to meet
the constitutional requirement of due process); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding
foreign nationals entitled to habeas corpus review of their detention as enemy combatants).
"7 See Youngstown Sheet& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634-38 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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The Bush 43 administration has exhibited both of these behaviors-a tendency to-
wards conceptually rigid interpretations of executive power and a penchant for minting
its own currency of formal legal legitimacy. The audaciousness--even bizarreness-
of these behaviors paints a clear and unattractive picture of the thin, ideologically driven
conception of the rule of law that is a hallmark of modern day presidentialism. But
to understand fully what is at stake, it is critical also to contrast rule of law formalism
with a more compelling alternative, a version of the rule of law that fits comfortably
with checks and balances and respect for constitutional pluralism. I call this alternative
the institutionalist conception because it emphasizes the informal norms and processes
of official self-restraint that are part of day-to-day government in a checks and balances
system. What we count on as the rule of law, under this more attractive conception,
depends at least as much on the informal ordering of the three branches' political
behavior as it does on the formal rules that purport to delimit each branch's authority.
After laying out the institutionalist version of the rule of law, this Article chronicles
the Bush administration's pursuit of its formalist alternative through the proliferation
of signing statements in which President Bush has stated constitutional objections to
statutes that he proceeds to sign into law. The real world context for these debates
may seem tamer than the war powers and national security issues that so often pre-
occupy our headlines-indeed, obscurity is an essential element of this part of the
presidentialist strategy. But the strategy is meant to shore up a power grab in both
foreign and domestic policymaking that has huge consequences for the democratic
character of our public administration.
I. THINKING HARD ABOUT THE FAMILIAR: WHAT DOES THE
RULE OF LAW MEAN?
Rule of law is one of those concepts that can seem hopelessly vague to academics
but commonsensical to most citizens.18 Imagine a survey that asks people the meaning
of the rule of law or of its close cousin, "a government of laws, and not of men." It
seems a safe wager that the most common answer would be some variant of the fol-
lowing: "The rule of law means that those in power cannot do what they want just
because they want to do it, or because they have force on their side. The rule of law
means they can do only what the law permits." Despite the intellectual puzzles that
philosophers might extract from that answer-for example, what counts as law?-my
brief experience of government 9 also suggests that something like this formulation
is deeply ingrained in how most people who work for the government actually think
of themselves and of the jobs they do.2°
18 For an exploration of this issue, see Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially
Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 Law & PHIL. 137 (2002).
19 I worked for the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice and
for the Office of Management and Budget.
20 1 have earlier explored some of the ideas of this section in Peter M. Shane, Legal
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Yet, to count as something like plausible common sense, the conventional
notion of the rule of law I have just described has to take account of two other equally
commonsensical facts. One is that public officials, even if conscientiously attentive
to law, will often find the law applicable to their particular problems or opportunities
to be genuinely vague. A Federal Communications Commissioner knows, for ex-
ample, that she cannot impose broadcast licensing conditions that do not serve the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity.' '21 But what does that actually mean as
a limitation on her decisionmaking?
The second fact is that, with regard to a great deal of-perhaps most-government
activity, the chances are remote that law can and will be enforced against nonconform-
ing behavior. Thus, for example, the officials who review Freedom of Information
Act requests know that the law imposes a specific obligation to respond within twenty
business days.22 They also know, if they dally for an extra day or two-and probably,
much longer than that-nothing adverse will happen to them. They will not be im-
prisoned, fined, or even reprimanded. Yet, as citizens, we still want and expect them
to obey the law. We expect the rule of law to operate even when the prospects of
sanction are remote.
The kind of government we have will clearly depend, to a significant degree,
on how government officials respond to the inevitability of legal uncertainty and lax
enforcement. Government officials might profess allegiance to the rule of law but still
interpret every legal ambiguity to favor their personal political preferences. They may
indulge their preferences as much as possible even in the implementation of clear
rules, so long as they can do so with impunity. As citizens, however, we can safely
dismiss this as an illegitimate view of the rule of law for one simple reason: it is un-
imaginable that any government official would be willing to declare in public, "This
is actually how I am behaving." What government officials want us to believe, even
when law is vague and enforcement is uncertain, is that they are behaving in a legally
accountable fashion. They want to appear to be guided by reasons they would be
willing to declare publicly, and these reasons must be consistent with the law they are
charged with implementing. They are thus mindful not only of what makes them
personally better off but also of the needs and interests of the public more generally
and of all the critical institutions of government. For this account to be plausible,
however, the written documents of law have to be buttressed by a set of norms, con-
ventional expectations, and routine behaviors that lead officials to behave as if they
are accountable to the public interest and to legitimate sources of legal and political
authority, even when the written rules are ambiguous and even when they could
probably get away with merely self-serving behavior.
Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege
Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REv. 461,485 (1987).
21 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
22 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(I) (2000).
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What I am describing is a version of the rule of law that is not formalistic but
institutional. Checks and balances, in operation, depend on an assemblage of norms,
cooperative arrangements, and informal coordination activities that actually fit the
political science definition of an unstructured institution. James March and Johan
Olsen have usefully defined an institution as "a relatively enduring collection of rules
and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are
relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to
the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external
circumstances. 23 Sometimes the relevant "rules and organized practices" are ex-
ceedingly clear and documented, like the rules inside the cover of a board game. But
sometimes, as political scientist Kenneth Shepsle has pointed out, these rules and prac-
tices "are more amorphous and implicit rather than formalized."'24 We still recognize
them as institutions because they "may be described as practices and recognized by
the patterns they induce, 25 but compared to, say, a game of golf, they are, relatively
speaking, "unstructured institutions. '"26 Understanding the rule of law as an unstruc-
tured institution provides a far more attractive account of what citizens expect from a
"government of laws" and a far more plausible account of why they might just get it.
An excellent example of what I have in mind is provided by the traditional stance
of Attorneys General with regard to assessing the constitutionality of congressional
enactments. For many decades, Attorneys General have advised their executive branch
clients that, outside of the separation of powers context, they will not call into question
the constitutionality of any congressional enactment unless the law is so patently
unconstitutional that no defense of it could be mounted in good conscience.27 Such
deference might be regarded as formally in conflict with the President's own oath to
protect and defend the Constitution 28-a promise that might entail a more searching
23 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Elaborating the "New Institutionalism," in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 3 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006)
[hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK].
24 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra
note 23, at 27.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 30.
27 Ordinarily, I would be content to say that it is not within the province of
the Attorney General to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional-
at least, where it does not involve any conflict between the prerogatives
of the legislative department and those of the executive department-and
that when an act like this, of general application, is passed it is the duty
of the executive department to administer it until it is declared unconsti-
tutional by the courts.
Rendition of Opinions on Constitutionality of Statutes-Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 39
Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 16 (1937) (quoting Income Tax-Salaries of President and Federal Judges,
31 Op. Att'y Gen. 475, 476 (1919)).
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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independent judgment. Yet, Attorneys General have realized that, in balancing this
independent obligation with the constitutional charge to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, 29 government works better, in the ordinary case, if issues of con-
stitutionality are left for the resolution of a disinterested judicial branch.
In late 2004, a group of former Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) attorneys, led by
former Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, were deeply upset by several
national security opinions issued by the Bush 43 Justice Department-most notably,
the so-called "torture memo" that defined with implausible narrowness the categories
of severe physical injury that count legally as torture3 -and felt compelled to distill
their criticisms in the form of recommended prescriptions to guide future OLC attor-
neys in the process of legal analysis on behalf of the executive branch. 3, Their ten
recommendations are all loose norms, not highly specified commands, such as: "OLC' s
obligation to counsel compliance with the law, and the insufficiency of the advocacy
model, pertain with special force in circumstances where OLC's advice is unlikely to
",32be subject to review by the courts, or "Whenever time and circumstances permit,
OLC should seek the views of all affected agencies and components of the Department
of Justice before rendering final advice.', 33 But the lawyers' statement does not merely
assert these recommendations as future-oriented prescriptions. They purport to be
descriptive, "based in large part on the longstanding practices of the Attorney General
and the Office of Legal Counsel, across time and administrations. 34 What they are
describing is part of the rule of law as an unstructured institution.
Once we make ourselves aware of the institutionalist version of the rule of law-
which I believe to be critical to democratic governance in a society as complex as
ours-yet another reason becomes clear for its unattractiveness to the right-wing
presidentialists of post-Reagan America. To the Reaganites and their successors,
the norms prevailing in American government as of 1980 were ineluctably associated
with a public policy regime that they considered too liberal, too egalitarian, too regula-
tory, too internationalist in outlook, and too oriented towards civil and human rights
at home and abroad. Anything based in pre-Reagan institutional norms of governance
was thus automatically suspect by virtue of its guilt by historical association with the
governing philosophy of the New Deal. This, I think, is a necessary part of the explana-
tion behind a wide range of right-wing norm-breaking initiatives since 198 1-including
29 Id. art. II, § 3.
30 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, for Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. § § 2340-2340A, reprinted in THETORTURE PAPERS: THEROADTO ABU GHRAIB 172
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
31 Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel, reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1345, 1348
(2006).
32 Id. at 1350.
13 Id. at 1353.
34 Id. at 1349.
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the Iran-Contra affair,35 the 1995 threat of government shutdown,36 the impeachment
of Bill Clinton,3 7 and Bush v. Gore.38 One can add to this list the imprisonment of
Americans as enemy combatants, the GOP upending of traditional congressional pro-
cedures between 2003 and 2006, and much more. Whether consciously or not, the
Right has placed no value on norms of governance that evolved between 1945 and
1980, and often earlier, to make interbranch friction manageable. Put bluntly, the
Right wants to jar the national government rightward and assumes that pre-1981 norms
are antagonistic to that aim. If long-standing norms of institutional behavior-including
rule of law norms-obstruct immediate accomplishment of the right-wing agenda,
they are abandoned.
A hallmark of the Bush administration's aggressive presidentialism has thus been
a seeming indifference to the informal ordering mechanisms that give life to the rule
of law. The administration's professed adherence to the rule of law purports to be
based predominantly on compliance with legal documents although, as it turns out,
their analysis is coherent only if we accept certain other informal background norms
as appropriate-norms that turn out to be deeply unpersuasive. Before turning to
that analysis, however, it will be helpful to explore the administration's formalism and
indifference to rule of law as expressed in presidential signing statements.
I. SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE FLOWERING OF FAUX LAW
Rule of law formalism, in the presidentialist mode, is characterized by two
conspicuous impulses. They are the insistence on the expansion of every claim of
executive power to the outer limits of analytic logic, and the imperative to generate
what looks like legal authority for even utterly unprecedented claims. The most
audacious display of these impulses has come with the administration's expanded
use of presidential "signing statements" to interpose constitutional objections to con-
gressional bills that the President was actually signing into law. When the President
vetoes a bill, the Constitution directs him to return Congress's bill to the first house
that voted on it, along with his objections. 39 There is no constitutional requirement
for the President to make any statement with regard to those bills he actually signs.
Yet, Presidents have long taken various occasions to promulgate signing statements
for legislation they are approving. These statements often tout the benefits that the
legislation is projected to achieve but may also state the President's policy reser-
vations with respect to aspects of the new law. On occasions that were relatively
35 See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, RONALD REAGAN: FATE, FREEDOM, AND THE MAKING OF
HISTORY 293-302 (2007).
36 See NIGEL HAMILTON, BILL CLINTON: MASTERING THE PRESIDENCY 569-72 (2007).
37 H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
38 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
'9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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rare-until the Bush administration-Presidents also used signing statements to
indicate doubts about the constitutionality of particular provisions of the newly en-
acted statutes they were signing. In such cases, Presidents typically say that they will
implement or interpret the statutory provision in question to minimize the perceived
constitutional difficulty.
The propriety of this practice is debatable. After all, each President swears to
protect and defend the Constitution.' If he thinks part of some bill is unconstitutional,
should he not feel duty-bound to veto what Congress has enacted? There are good
reasons, however, why Presidents may think differently. Most obviously, a great deal
of legislation takes the form of a fairly complex package, some of which a President
may think is urgently required for the good of the country. Requiring him to veto an
entire bill because some narrow feature of the package is arguably unconstitutional
may be exacting too high a price in terms of sacrificing the public interest as embodied
in those parts of the new law that the President thinks are salutary. Moreover, a
President might responsibly take the position that, in the ordinary case, the courts
are available to address questions of law. Courts are perhaps better positioned to
decide questions of unconstitutionality. If a provision of an enacted bill is unconsti-
tutional in a way that inflicts harm on particular members of the public, anyone
harmed can sue to vindicate their rights. A court most often can effectively excise the
offending provision from the law.
On a number of occasions, however, Presidents have stated constitutional
objections precisely because the law is arguably objectionable in a way that would
be very difficult for a private party to challenge in court. In such cases, the President
may object because there would not be an effective judicial alternative to test the
constitutionality of the offending legal provision. Prior to the Bush administration,
a fairly common constitutional objection in signing statements involved a legislative
practice called the legislative veto.4 Congress, from the late 1920s on, started inserting
40 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
41 The following is typical of the genre:
While I am signing S. 1192, it contains a legislative veto provision which
the Attorney General advises is unconstitutional. Section 114(e) of the
bill would purport to authorize either of two committees of Congress to
pass a resolution disapproving the expenditure of any sums in excess of
$29 million from certain rail programs for the rehabilitation of Union
Station. However, committees of Congress cannot bind the executive
branch in the execution of the law by passing a resolution that is not
adopted by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President for
approval or veto. Accordingly, this language of section 114(e) must be
objected to on constitutional grounds. The Secretary of Transportation
will not, consistent with this objection, regard himself as legally bound by
any such resolution.
Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1207
(Dec. 29, 1981).
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so-called "legislative veto" provisions into laws that extended some significant admin-
istrative authority to the executive branch.42 Under a legislative veto provision, if
Congress delegates administrative authority to an executive agency and then decides
it is unhappy with how the executive branch implements that authority, it can nullify
what the executive branch has done without enacting a new law.43 Under a two-house
veto, the executive action would be nullified so long as both the House and the Senate
disapprove it, even though their disapproval would take the form of a concurrent reso-
lution that would not be sent to the President for his signature or veto.44 Under a one-
house veto, either the House or the Senate alone could nullify executive action through
its own resolution, again without giving the President any further say in the matter.45
Legislative vetoes are all but literally in contradiction with the normal legislative
process that the Constitution spells out. Imagine that Congress enacts a law that
originally allows the President to implement any of four options for effecting some
public policy, A, B, C, or D. If he does D and Congress disapproves, Congress-
following the usual legislative process-could always seek to enact a law that amends
the first statute, so that, henceforth, only options A, B, and C are authorized. The
political difficulty facing Congress, however, would be that the second, amending
bill would also get sent to the President for his signature or veto before it could become
law. The amendment barring the executive branch from pursuing Option D would
become law only if the President signed the second statute, or if Congress enacted
the amendment over his veto. It is this opportunity for presidential veto that is pre-
cisely what the legislative veto was trying to avoid. Under a legislative veto provision,
Congress would give itself permission to nullify Option D without having to send a
new law to the President for his review. Understandably, Presidents reacted adversely
to departures from the constitutionally designed legislative process that would undercut
their veto power, which is the executive's primary check on the legislative branch.
This would seem to be a separation of powers violation of a high order.
But there was another reason for objecting to legislative vetoes. There was a
good case to be made that they were not only unconstitutional-a conclusion that
the Supreme Court did, in fact, come to when a legislative veto case finally reached
the Court in 1983 46 -but that they were also genuinely detrimental to the public
interest.47 The existence of a legislative veto in an administrative statute creates legal
uncertainty. Agencies effectively do not know the scope of their authority until they
42 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
43 See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
62-68 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing objections to, and litigation over, the legislative veto).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
47 See generally Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369 (1977)
(discussing problems with legislative vetoes).
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determine what will pass muster with the current Congress. The President cannot
know fully the scope of the authority he originally signed into law. Giving Congress
time to decide whether to veto administrative action adds delay to the regulatory
process. In promulgating regulations, the executive branch is ordinarily required to
publish a notice of its intentions and to allow the public to comment on the regu-
lations in proposed form. The legislative veto process can make a sham out of this
process because an agency knows that, no matter what the public says, the agency has
to please the current Congress not the public. There are other arguments to be made,
pro and con, on the policy merits of legislative vetoes, but the fundamental point is
this: in objecting to legislative vetoes, Presidents were objecting to a practice that
threatened to undermine their own central role in the scheme of checks and balances,
and their objections were based on both strong constitutional argument and strong
arguments of public policy.
By one count, the total number of statutory provisions to which Presidents
objected on constitutional grounds between the administration of George Washington
and the beginning of the first Reagan administration was 101.48 The advent of the
Reagan administration, however, marked both a significant increase in the frequency
of the device and a dramatic departure in terms of its intended institutional signifi-
cance. Attorney General Edwin Meese persuaded West Publishing, which publishes
federal laws, also to publish the President's signing statements.49 The signing statements
were intended to become, as one report explained, "a strategic weapon in a campaign
to influence the way legislation was interpreted by the courts and Executive agencies."5°
Over the course of two administrations, President Reagan, through his signing
statements, objected to or unilaterally reinterpreted seventy-one statutory provisions."
In a single term, President George H.W. Bush objected to 146.52 Most of the objections
involved the President's asserted foreign policy powers, although many reflected the
administration's full embrace of the unitary executive theory and some of the more
expansive claims of presidentialist constitutionalism. 53 President Clinton used the
signing statement device also; his objections to 105 statutory provisions 4 exceeded
the record of President Reagan but were more modest than the record of President
4' CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" LAWS:
REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 76 (1998).
49 AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POwERS DOCTRINE 10 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signing-statements recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
50 Id.
11 T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRESIDENTIALSIGNING
STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 3 (2007) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
52 Id. at 5.
5 See id.
4 Id. at 6.
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Bush 41. In terms of robust presidentialism, however, none of these three Presidents
can compete with the record of the Bush 43 administration. In his first six years in
office, President George W. Bush raised over 1400 constitutional objections to roughly
1000 statutory provisions, over three times the total of his forty-two predecessors
combined." But it is not just the numbers that make the Bush signing statements
distinctive. Unlike the long-standing presidential objections to legislative vetoes, the
Bush objections are frequently based on no legal authority whatever and have nothing
to do with any plausible version of the public interest.
So many examples exist of the bizarreness of this practice that I take, almost at
random, the President's signing statement for the 2006 Postal Accountability and
Enhancement Act.5 6 That Act amends the law describing an agency called the Postal
Regulatory Commission. As amended, this rather undramatic law now reads as follows:
The Postal Regulatory Commission is composed of 5 Commis-
sioners, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Commissioners shall be chosen solely
on the basis of their technical qualifications, professional stand-
ing, and demonstrated expertise in economics, accounting, law,
or public administration, and may be removed by the President
only for cause. Each individual appointed to the Commission
shall have the qualifications and expertise necessary to carry out
the enhanced responsibilities accorded Commissioners under the
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act. Not more than 3 of
the Commissioners may be adherents of the same political party.57
In signing the act, the President objected to this provision as one of two in the act that
"purport to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President
may select appointees in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best
qualified by experience and knowledge to fill the positions."5 8 He then went on to
state that the executive branch would construe these provisions "in a manner consistent
with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution."" In other words, President Bush
wanted to go on record as objecting to this innocuous statute as a violation of his power
to nominate and appoint officers of the United States and said he would read the law
in some unspecified manner that would be consistent with his authority.
" Kinkopf & Shane, supra note 6.
56 Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 (2006).
57 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 39 U.S.C.A. § 502(a) (West Supp. 2007).
58 Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 42 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2196, 2196 (Dec. 20, 2006).
59 Id.
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Putting aside constitutional issues for a moment, what exactly could the President
be thinking here? The statute invites the President to nominate new commission
members "on the basis of their technical qualifications, professional standing, and
demonstrated expertise in economics, accounting, law, or public administration."")
What "large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge"
could possibly be excluded by this requirement? The statute does say the President
may not appoint more than three of the five commission members from any one political
party. He thus has to find at least two Democrats, two Republicans, two independents
or some combination in addition to any three Commission members who belong to the
same party. It boggles the mind to think of this as a substantial limit on the President's
capacity to identify the best qualified person for any given opening. For it to be any
limit at all, there would have to be fewer than two members of the Democratic or
Republican parties whom the President would regard as among his favorite candidates
for the Postal Regulatory Commission. Because Congress's specifications are so broad
and commonsensical, there is no plausible objection to be made that Congress's new
version of the law compromises the public interest in a serious way. The only tenable
reason for objecting would be the formalist syllogism: Congress may not constitu-
tionally demand that the President nominate John Smith or Jill Jones, in particular, for
any particular office. To the presidential formalist, this implies that Congress may
impose no constraints on the President at all regarding his choice of nominee.
The strangeness of the President's insistence is all the more apparent, however, if
one considers the institutional context we are discussing. The statutory qualifications
for postal rate commissioners are legally unenforceable. If the President fails to nomi-
nate someone meeting the statutory standards, no one can sue him. Senators might
decline to confirm a nominee they believe falls short of the statutory standard, but
Senators are entitled to vote no on any nominee for any reason they want, so this hardly
leaves the President worse off. To object to a statutory specification of qualifications
in this context is really to say to Congress,
I, the President of the United States, am offended, constitutionally
speaking, that you think I even have to listen to you with regard to
the qualifications of potential office holders. It is irrelevant that
this office operates directly to fulfill Congress's constitutionally
vested authorities with regard to interstate commerce and the post.
Many of President Bush's constitutional objections fall within areas about which
Presidents are typically protective. Of the over 1400 objections lodged in signing
statements between 2001 and 2006, seventy-six mention potential interference with
Commander-in-Chief powers, 147 mention interference with his constitutional au-
thorities regarding diplomacy and foreign affairs, and another 170 point to alleged
60 39 U.S.C.A. § 502(a).
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violations of the President's constitutional authorities to withhold or control access
to information to protect foreign relations or national security, sometimes mentioning
also his power to protect executive branch deliberative processes or the performance
of the executive's constitutional duties.6'
Even in these traditional contexts, however, the substance of the President's
objections is often extreme and hypertechnical. For example, one provision alleged
to raise issues regarding executive privilege62 was a legal requirement in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 that certain reports to congressional intelli-
gence committees must be in writing and include an executive summary. 63 Similarly,
the President found a violation of his foreign affairs powers64 in provisions of the so-
called Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 that
required him to take certain actions against Syria unless the President either determines
and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Syria has taken specific actions
or "determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to" waive
such requirements and reports the reasons for that determination to the Congress. 65
In other words, Congress violates the Constitution-according to President Bush-when
it requires him to either perform an act or not perform it, at his sole discretion.
For comic constitutionalism, however, it is hard to beat the following: a statutory
provision allegedly in potential conflict with the President's Commander-in-Chief
powers would put limits on the number of Defense Department civilian and military
personnel who could be assigned to the Pentagon's Legislative Affairs office.' Accord-
ing to the President, Congress
cannot constitutionally restrict the authority of the President to
control the activities of members of the armed forces, including
whether and how many members of the Armed Forces assigned to
the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combat-
ant commands, or any other element of the Department of Defense
shall perform legislative affairs or legislative liaison functions.67
61 Kinkopf & Shane, supra note 6, at 177.
62 Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 37
WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001).
63 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
64 Statement on Signing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration
Act of 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1795 (Dec. 12, 2003).
65 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-175, § 5(a)(b), 117 Stat.
2482, 2487-88 (2003).
66 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8098, 115 Stat.
2230, 2269 (2002).
67 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 46, 48 (Jan. 10, 2002).
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Apparently, lobbying Congress is an executive act of war.
Going beyond these somewhat astonishing claims in areas of traditional presi-
dential concern, there are hundreds in wholly novel areas. For example, the President
objected to 212 legally imposed reporting requirements as interfering with his con-
stitutional authority to recommend measures to Congress. 6' Apparently, President
Bush believes that the President's entitlement to speak his mind to Congress entails
a prohibition on Congress demanding any other reports or recommendations from the
executive branch. This is an historically baseless argument, as our original Secretary
of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton-the most presidentialist of the Fram-
ers--clearly found himself as responsible for filing reports with Congress as to the
President.69 Any constitutional infirmity in the requirement of executive reports to
Congress is entirely a figment of the contemporary presidentialist imagination.
In his first six years in office, President George W. Bush lodged 363 objections
based on Congress's alleged interference with the President's control over the "unitary
executive. ' Many of these assertions seem to be merely "piling on" with regard to
other, narrower objections. Thus, when the President objects to a congressional man-
date that some executive branch official do something with regard to foreign affairs,
the President may object on both the foreign affairs ground-i.e., Congress may not
make foreign policy-and the unitary executive ground-i.e., Congress may not instruct
the President how to use his subordinates.7' Likewise, when the President objects to
a congressional requirement that a subordinate member of the executive branch file a
report with Congress on the ground that this violates the President's "recommendations"
power, he may also object on unitary executive grounds, again, that Congress is telling
someone subordinate to the President what to do.72
Beyond these merely cumulative "unitary executive" objections, some invocations
of the unitary executive appear to be distinctively rooted in the Bush administration's
imagined authority to direct personally the discretionary activity of every member of
68 Kinkopf & Shane, supra note 6, at 177.
' See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 240-42 (1989) (explaining the increased role of
Congress in the Treasury Department); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American
Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALEL.J. 1256, 1284-87 (2006)
(noting that Congress claimed a greater role in the Treasury Department than in other execu-
tive departments).
70 Kinkopf & Shane, supra note 6, at 177.
7' See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 40 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2673 (Oct. 28, 2004) (objecting to the
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No.
108-375, § 1207(b)(1), 118 Stat. 1811, 2085 (2004)).
72 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of
2004,40 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1518 (Aug. 9,2004) (objecting to the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-293, §§ 217,708(c)(2), 803(c)(1 1), 118
Stat. 1028, 1038, 1077, 1081 (2004)).
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the executive branch on any subject, regardless of what the law prescribes. For
example, one statutory provision to which the President objected on "unitary execu-
tive grounds" is section 115 of the 2002 Act "to provide for improvement of federal
education research, statistics, evaluation, information, and dissemination and for other
purposes. 73 The Act creates an Institute of Education Sciences within the Department
of Education, to be run by a director and aboard.74 Section 115 requires the director
to propose Institute priorities for board approval.75 The President of the United States,
of course, has no inherent constitutional power over education. Yet, executive branch
lawyers seem to imagine that it somehow violates the separation of powers either
to allow the director to recommend priorities or for the board to decide on those pri-
orities without presidential intervention.7 6 In a similar vein is a "unitary executive"
objection to a statutory provision requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to consider,
in preparing his annual budget, the recommendations of an advisory committee on
specialty crops .7 7 Although the law does not require the Secretary actually to implement
those recommendations, but merely to take them into account, the President implicitly
believes that he has inherent authority to forbid subordinates from giving any weight
whatsoever to public policy input from any source other than the White House.8
These examples all demonstrate the expansive interpretive tendency described
above with regard to the President's appointment power. The strategy is to insist, in
bright-line terms, on the most ambitious and rigid assertions of any conceded execu-
tive power. But why have these signing statements proliferated now? The views they
embody, even if earlier GOP Presidents pushed them less aggressively, were certainly
held also by leading legal thinkers under both Presidents Reagan and Bush 41. As legal
formalists, the lawyers in earlier administrations would surely have appreciated, as
much as Bush 43 lawyers, the existence of some formal documents embodying their
presidentialist claims that could be cited as a species of legal precedent for their argu-
ments. Moreover, Bush's recent GOP predecessors, facing Congresses controlled
by Democrats, actually had less political room to work their will than he had until
2007. One thus might have expected to find them even more strident than Bush 43
in asserting their prerogatives of unilateral action.
As it happens, however, what seems to have tempted Bush 43 to use signing
statements so aggressively is not their political necessity but, rather, the fact that he
73 Pub. L. No. 107-279, § 115, 116 Stat. 1940, 1948 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
9511 (a) (Supp. IV 2004)).
74 Id. § 111(a), 116 Stat. at 1944.
" Id. § 115(b), 116 Stat. at 1948.
76 See Statement on Signing Legislation to Provide for Improvement of Federal Education
Research, Statistics, Evaluation, Information, and Dissemination, and for Other Purposes, 38
WEEKLY COMp. PRES. DOC. 1995 (Nov. 5, 2002).
77 Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-465, § 1408A(d), 118
Stat. 3882, 3886 (2004).
78 Statement on Signing the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY
COMp. PREs. Doc. 3009 (Dec. 21, 2004).
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could get away with them in the face of a largely quiescent Congress. From 2001 to
2006, and especially after Republicans took the Senate in 2002, Congress most often
did not stand up to the President on his claims of unilateral power. The President
set forth his objections so frequently because Congress was not pushing back. Had
Congress been standing up for its own prerogatives with customary institutional vigor,
one would have expected ambitious signing statements to be matched with equally
robust rhetorical responses-or more-from the House and Senate. That simply did
not happen.
The 2006 election, returning congressional control to Democrats, has the potential
to alter this dynamic. Consider again the 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement
Act, which we have already noted for the President's objections to the specification
of qualifications for Postal Rate Commissioners.7 9 A more newsworthy section of
the statute provided for the maintenance of a class of domestic sealed mail, which
could not "be opened except under authority of a search warrant authorized by law,
or by an officer or employee of the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining
an address at which the letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the authorization of the
addressee."8 With regard to this provision, the President's signing statement responded:
"The executive branch shall construe [this] subsection.., to the maximum extent
permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances, such as to
protect human life and safety against hazardous materials, and the need for physical
searches specifically authorized by law for foreign intelligence collection.' In other
words, this Bush signing statement asserts that the President retains authority to open
first-class mail without a warrant, notwithstanding the plain statutory language.
The November 2006 ouster of so many right-wing Republicans from Congress,
however, emboldened not only Democrats, but also the few remaining Republican
moderates to push back. One such GOP member, Senator Susan Collins of Maine,
introduced a resolution in January 2007 reaffirming the Constitution's protection of
sealed mail from warrantless search. 2 Should such a resolution be enacted, any future
presidentialist who wanted to cite the 2006 Bush signing statement as some sort of legal
legitimation for the President's authority to inspect the mail would have to acknowl-
edge Congress's formal disagreement. Whether responses like this would temper
signing statement practice is uncertain, but they can certainly diminish the utility of
the signing statement mechanism as an opportunity for the President to erect without
challenge an edifice of unilateral utterances to stand as ersatz legal authority for un-
substantiated claims of executive authority. What happened from 2001 to 2006 was the
Bush administration's exploitation of congressional passivity to generate a series of
" See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
80 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, § 1010(e), 120 Stat.
3198, 3262 (2006) (amending 39 U.S.C. § 404 (2000)).
81 Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 42 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2196, 2196 (Dec. 20, 2006).
82 S. Res. 22, 110th Cong. (2007).
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documentary artifacts that can impersonate legal authority for unilateral presidentialist
legal interpretation.
III. PRESIDENTIALIST NORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Given our Delphic constitutional text, a paucity of supportive judicial opinions,
and obviously little congressional ratification for the executive branch's most prodi-
gious ambitions, it is easy enough to imagine why Presidents would want to invent
legal authority for their initiatives. Yet the interpretive theory embodied in so many
of the Bush 43 signing statements-a kind of categorical formalism that reads every
constitutional kernel of executive power as a signal of broad and unregulable presi-
dential authority-is open to an exceedingly obvious objection as a method of reading
the Constitution. That is, if Article II, which creates the presidency, can and should
be read so rigidly and expansively, should that not also be the way we read Article I,
which vests the authorities of Congress? How can the Commander-in-Chief Clause
imply so much and the power to declare war imply so little? How can the President's
implicit authority to protect executive branch information convey more authority
to withhold testimony and documents than Congress's implicit authority to investi-
gate government operations conveys the power to demand them? Of course, if we
read both articles this way, the powers of Congress and the President will come
frequently into conflict. But, then, the constitutional text would seem to specify
clearly who is supposed to win such battles. It expressly authorizes Congress "To
make all Laws ... necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the authorities
vested by the Constitution in any officer of the United States.83 Given this express
congressional power over the Presidents, should not a constitutional formalist always
favor congressional power over the executive? How can presidentialism ignore this
obvious problem?
A candid presidentialist response to this would require an acknowledgment that
pure formalism cannot work as a complete theory of what the rule of law entails.
Recent Republican administrations have been hostile to the prevailing norms of
checks and balances governance, and they seem to disregard informal norms gen-
erally as a critical element in their thinking about the rule of law. Yet, to explain
their preference for reading Article II more expansively than Article I, presidentialists
have to rely on an implicit normative understanding of the Constitution. They have
to have some kind of informal understanding of how to read the Constitution that is
not actually contained in its text, but that justifies always coming down on the side of
the presidency. If we read the academic work of the presidentialists, this informal
understanding becomes clear: presidentialists feel justified in elevating Article 11 over
Article I because they regard the executive branch as a better institution than Congress.
They think it better at making decisions because it is more centralized and hierarchical.'
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
' See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
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They may think it is better at handling sensitive information because of the same struc-
tural features. And, most notably, they think it more reliable in pursuing the national
interest because the President, unlike his legislative colleagues, is accountable to
a national constituency, thus supposedly fostering an accountability to the general
interest that is less parochial and less factional than the perspectives of individual
members of Congress."
These nonnative claims are important to evaluate, especially because the last does
not hold water, and the others are easily overstated.86 In considering the implications
of presidentialism for the rule of law, however, it is important for the moment to point
out that the Framers did not share this sense of executive branch superiority for making
policy decisions. On the contrary, they designed an elaborate and pluralistic legisla-
tive process out of the conviction that Congress's structural characteristics-its size
and bicameral design-were superior for resolving issues of public policy because
they would insure due discussion and thorough deliberation. State legislative abuses
during the 1780s had undoubtedly prompted a rethinking of the importance of execu-
tive power and of reliable checks against legislative excess.8 7 But this rethinking
did not entail any rethinking of the basic legislative role and its primacy. Whether
privileging executive power in the making of public policy makes contemporary sense
may be debatable, but it would not have made sense to the founding generation. To
the extent presidentialism embraces informal norms of governance or legal interpre-
tation that disrespects the role and perspective of Congress, presidentialism is at odds
with constitutional originalism.
Still, it might well be asked how much all of this lawyerly complexity really
matters. Even if we concede that the President is fabricating baseless constitutional
objections to the statutory qualifications for Postal Rate Commissioners or the obligation
of the Secretary of Agriculture to listen to an advisory board on specialty crops, this may
not seem worthy of public agitation. But it does matter, in two important respects.
First, the signing statements are intended to help legitimate a specific form of
presidentialist initiative that is less known to the public than such matters as wire-
tapping and war-making, but, in terms of day-to-day governance, arguably more signifi-
cant. This is the recent revolution in the President's relationship to the policymaking
bureaucracy-the agencies that regulate virtually every aspect of Americans' social and
economic activity, including critical matters of public health and safety. Our recent
CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 106 (1994) (discussing the Framers' structural choices).
85 See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995) (explaining the debate between presidentialists and
anti-presidentialists).
86 See generally Edward Rubin, The Myth ofAccountability and the Anti-administrative
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (criticizing the conflicting ideas about securing
accountability); Shane, supra note 2 (tracing the stances of modem administrations on the
assertion of executive power).
87 See Frank Goodman, Mark Tushnet on Liberal Constitutional Theory: Mission
Impossible, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2259, 2310 (1989) (book review).
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Presidents have asserted unprecedented authority to determine how all such policy
is made, and their signing statements could be used as something that looks like legal
authority for executive usurpation.88 They are formal documents, officially antholo-
gized and electronically searchable. They are connected to an assigned presidential
role in the constitutional order. Legally speaking, their content is discretionary with
the President. If they say something often enough, these presidential utterances, thus
solemnized, may begin to look like law. They are duly executed and ceremonially
delivered. They are citable. They are precedents of a sort. One is tempted, however,
to say that they are faux law in just the way creation science is faux science. Left un-
challenged, they may still have the power to cow Congress and shape the behavior
of executive underlings.
But the second point is that the Bush 43 signing statements and the administration's
litigiousness over executive privilege are part of the more general presidentialist ethos
of government. Presidentialism is a form of institutional ambition that feeds on itself,
and presidential signing statements are both a reflection of and encouragement for a
psychology of constitutional entitlement. The future of specialty crops may be less
newsworthy than Guantanamo or NSA wiretapping, but the sense of unilateral authority
that fuels the President's stance on obscure matters helps to maintain the attitudes-
the norms of governance-that lead to other, more consequential claims of unilateral
executive authority. An important function of the Bush 43 signing statements is that
they serve as reminders to administration members, and especially to administration
lawyers, of how the President wants the administration to behave: claim maximum
power, concede minimum authority to the other branches.
This is how the thin, formalist rule of law reflected in the signing statements
relates to the slipshod, sometimes unethical government lawyering revealed in such
extreme episodes as the "torture memo. ' 89 The Bush 43 administration's repeated
utterance of its constitutional philosophy shapes executive branch behavior by solidi-
fying allegiance to norms of hostility to external accountability. Like the torture memo
or the rationalizations for warrantless NSA wiretapping of domestic telephone calls,
the Bush 43 signing statements embody both a disregard for the institutional authori-
ties of the other branches--especially Congress-and a disregard for the necessity to
ground legal claims in plausible law. They are best understood as an attempt to invent
law and as an exploitation of Congress's unwillingness, at least while in Republican
hands, to allow the administration's more extreme theories of presidential authority
to go unchallenged.
88 See generally Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114HARv. L. REv. 2245 (2001)
(defending the system of "presidential administration" embraced by the Clinton administration).
89 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C.
§ § 2340-2340A, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen
J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
